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This paper analyzes municipal expenditures in the light of horizontal fiscal inter-
actions. I investigate total expenditures and a set of non-earmarked expenditure
subcategories in the largest German federal state, North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW).
The empirical analysis is based on a Spatial Durbin Model in a panel for the years
2009-2015. Using a two-regime spatial matrix, I also examine the impact of ag-
glomeration on the intensity of public expenditure interactions, thus testing the
hypothesis that an agglomerated region can decrease the amount of public goods
without losing mobile factors to the periphery.
The findings indicate that significant municipal expenditure interaction effects do
exist. The reaction functions also vary for different expenditure subcategories. Un-
like spillover effects and fiscal competition, yardstick competition is an insignificant
source of potential interactions. Expenditure interaction is fiercer if there is less
agglomeration in a municipality. Urbanized and populous municipalities appear
to benefit from agglomeration economies, a fact that enables them to spend less.
Robustness checks confirm the findings.
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In the last two decades, increasing research attention has been dedicated to the empirical analysis of 
inter-governmental fiscal interactions, notably horizontal externalities (Case 1993; Foucault et al. 2008; 
Borck et al. 2015; Costa et al. 2015; Fossen et al. 2017, etc.). Interactions are a feature of multi-tiered 
governments where each jurisdiction sets its own tax or spending level and thereby influences the other 
jurisdictions in their level of spending or taxation. It is particularly interesting for the light it sheds on 
the implications of public and decentralization policies at the local level. Fiscal interactions occur for 
three major reasons that have been widely discussed in the literature. The first is public expenditure 
spillovers, the second centers around fiscal competition, and the last factor is yardstick competition 
(Revelli 2005). 
A large body of literature focuses on tax interactions in particular, and most of it finds evidence for 
positive effects. Tax burdens in one jurisdiction are interdependent with those in neighboring 
jurisdictions. One of the first studies on tax mimicking in US counties identifies a positive interaction 
effect (Ladd 1992). Other studies on the US also point to positive coefficients (Case 1993; Besley and 
Case 1995; Frederiksson et al. 2004; Crowley and Sobel 2011). They investigate different tax variables 
such as sales tax, income or property tax, and total tax revenues. Similar papers focusing on the Eurozone 
are Büttner (1999, 2001), discussing all German counties as well as the municipalities of Baden-
Wuerttemberg, Sollé-Ollé (2003), investigating selected Spanish municipalities, Bordignon et al. (2003) 
on Italian municipalities, Feld et al. (2003) on French regions, and Feld and Reulier (2009) on Swiss 
cantons. All these studies find positive tax externalities in neighboring jurisdictions. 
Spatial interactions in the level and structure of expenditures have been given less attention in the 
literature than tax interactions. However, in the last two decades they have become noticeably more 
important because local governments very often do not have large tax competencies, and hence spending 
decisions gain much more weight. Where interactions do exist, they are relevant for investment decisions 
by municipalities and may influence the design of public policies. Recent studies on spending 
interactions, such as Case et al. (1993), Redoano (2007), Št’astná (2009), Frère et al. (2014), Costa et 
al. (2015), Qu et al. (2016) and Fossen et al. (2017) come up with ambiguous findings. Comparability 
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between these papers is limited. Only a few of them set their sights on municipal expenditure interactions 
between total expenses and non-earmarked subcategories at a local level, examples being Case et al. 
(1993), Št’astná (2009), Costa et al. (2015), or Fossen et al. (2017). As interactions are expected to be 
stronger at municipal-government level than at higher levels, this lack of research results is remarkable. 
Accordingly, an initial aim of the present paper is to investigate empirically whether expenditure 
interactions exist at the municipal level in NRW, in particular in non-earmarked subcategories.  
From a theoretical point of view, local governments spend most of their money on guaranteeing the 
provision of public goods and services. These are not limited to the residents of the jurisdiction that 
supplies them, a fact referred to in the theory of pure public goods (Samuelson 1954) as “non-
excludability.” As predicted by the Tiebout model of local public goods, governments provide public 
goods financed by local revenues. Residents are mobile, and in order to maximize utility, they will 
gravitate to those jurisdictions that enable them to profit from an optimal amount of public goods in 
conjunction with favorable tax rates (voting by feet) (Tiebout 1956). Jurisdictions will therefore be 
competing for mobile factors. Such theories suggest that local governments compare themselves with 
neighboring municipalities so as to stay competitive, under the proviso that they cannot limit domestic 
public goods and services to their own residents.  
In the New Economic Geography (NEG) framework, hump-shaped agglomeration rents (Wang and 
Zeng 2013) may cause the results for the provision of public goods to differ from those found in classical 
competition models. NEG researchers Andersson and Forslid (2003) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004) 
state that such agglomeration rents do exist. They could be important for asymmetrical regions because 
an agglomerated region may conceivably decrease the amount of public goods without losing mobile 
factors to the periphery. The reason is that companies and employees gain extra profits from 
agglomeration economies. Other theoretical studies operating on this premise are Ludema and Wooton 
(2000), Baldwin et al. (2003, chs. 15 and 16), etc.  
However, no study so far has considered local expenditures in the context of agglomeration economies. 
I claim that the combination of expenditure interactions at local levels and agglomeration rents may be 
of relevance and should therefore be examined. A negative relationship between the provision of public 
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goods and the indicators of agglomeration should be observed in case agglomeration rents exist. In this 
paper, I study the impact of agglomeration on the reaction function, i.e. the parameter that indicates 
whether the expenditure levels determined by a government have any effect on neighboring 
expenditures. In jurisdictions with agglomeration rents, the slope of the reaction function should flatten. 
To date, there are few studies that have looked into the impact of agglomeration forces in this context, 
and those that do so concentrate on tax interactions only (Charlot and Paty 2010; Fréret and Maguain 
2017). 
This paper thus investigates empirically whether high- or low-regime agglomeration municipalities are 
less or more responsive to horizontal expenditure interaction. The best measure of agglomeration 
economies is not obvious. I use population density, as it is both readily available and informative (other 
agglomeration indices are also applied) (Ciccone and Hall 1996; Hill 2008; Charlot and Paty 2010; 
Briant et al. 2010).  
One of the possible mechanisms underlying interactions is yardstick competition. Should yardstick 
competition be responsible for interactions, the reaction function would decline as the municipal 
electoral margin increases – another hypothesis that is tested in this paper. As pointed out both by Costa 
et al. (2011) and Costa and Carvalho (2013), agglomeration economies can reduce the pressure from 
yardstick competition. Expenditure interaction in these municipalities is expected to be lower. 
The ambiguous results produced by the literature discussed above and the existing research gap are 
reason enough to empirically analyze municipal expenditures in the light of spatial interactions. As a 
phenomenon, expenditure mimicking has important policy implications for the design of fine-tuned 
public policies and the identification of geographical disparities. The objective of this paper is threefold. 
First, I investigate spatial interdependencies between the expenditures of German municipalities in 
North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and their interaction behavior. To the best of my knowledge, this has 
not been done before. One contribution this paper makes is to focus not only on total expenditures but 
also on a complete set of non-earmarked expenditure subcategories. As suggested by theory and the 
literature, the reaction functions can vary for different expenditure subcategories. It is entirely possible 
that the expenditure subcategories will reveal that complementarity and substitutability neutralize each 
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other or lower the total interaction effect (Costa et al. 2015). At the municipal level, knowledge on fiscal 
interactions in different expenditure subcategories is limited.  
The second main contribution of the article is the exploration of yardstick competition as a possible 
explanation for expenditure interactions. Thirdly, there is no study so far that analyzes the effects of 
agglomeration on the intensity of public expenditure interactions. In contrast to previous studies on 
agglomeration and fiscal interaction, I shall not examine the effect of agglomeration on equilibrium tax 
rates but on expenditures across local jurisdictions. Studying the German case is also particularly 
interesting because German municipalities have a high degree of autonomy in planning their 
expenditure. The municipalities of NRW act within the same constitutional framework, thus simplifying 
the identification of fiscal interactions. 
In my empirical analysis, spatial regression models are used to study fiscal interactions. This puts it in 
line with studies referred to earlier that either use an instrumental variables (IV) or the maximum 
likelihood (ML) model. In the main specification, I use a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) in a panel 
framework. Due to the panel structure, and in contrast to the cross-sectional studies by Št’astná (2009) 
and Borck at al. (2007), I also control for spatial and time-fixed effects as ignoring them would lead to 
biases. The panel data set spans seven years from 2009 to 2015 in the municipalities of North Rhine-
Westphalia (NRW). I test a large set of different spatial weighting matrices, also in assessing the 
robustness of my results. One robustness check contrasts the core results with instrumental variable/ 
GMM estimations. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section addresses theoretical considerations 
on fiscal interaction. The data is described in the third section. Section four specifies the empirical 
model, endogeneity issues, and the spatial weighting matrices. After that, the fifth section presents the 




THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON FISCAL INTERACTION 
Fiscal interactions occur due to public expenditure spillovers, fiscal competition, or yardstick 
competition (Revelli 2005; Št’astná 2009; Borck et al. 2015). I begin with a brief description of these 
factors.  
Public expenditure spillovers occur when one local government’s activities have an effect on the welfare 
function of another jurisdiction (Gordon 1983). In other words, the activity of a local government 
directly affects the preferences of another local government. Expenditure spillovers may be positive or 
negative, depending on whether the neighbors’ expenditures are complements or substitutes. An 
example of expenditure spillovers would be the provision of a cultural good such as the construction of 
a theater, which due to higher welfare might lead to decreases in expenditure for cultural goods in the 
neighboring municipality. Free-riding by the neighboring government would be an optimal reaction. 
The second possible explanation for fiscal interactions can be gleaned from the literature on fiscal 
competition (Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986; Wilson 1999). Assuming spatial mobility, residents and 
businesses will move to those jurisdictions that meet their demand for public goods at lower prices in 
terms of taxation.  Jurisdictions may increase expenditures or lower taxes in order to attract residents 
and firms (Št’astná 2009) and thus indirectly affect each other’s policies, resulting in competition among 
governments for residents and businesses (Wilson 1999). 
A third reason for fiscal interactions is yardstick competition, which is based on informational spillovers. 
Residents take the policies of a neighboring jurisdiction as a yardstick and compare them to the policies 
of their own government. Residents thus have (imperfect and asymmetric) information on which to 
evaluate the performance of their government. If the voters rate the achievements as poor, the 
politicians’ chances of being re-elected decrease. Politicians have an incentive to mimic neighboring 
policies (Salmon 1987; Besley and Case 1995) to prevent this from happening. 
The identification of the various driving forces behind fiscal interaction patterns is complex and difficult, 
not least because the spatial reaction functions are the same (Revelli 2005). However, some studies 
analyzing the causes of horizontal interactions suggest that yardstick competition is in fact the main 
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source (Allers and Elhorst 2005; Elhorst and Feret 2009; Wasserfallen 2014, etc.). This verdict will also 
be tested in this paper. Nevertheless, I do not intend to play off one theory against another. For an 
example of how to distinguish between underlying strategic interactions, see Baicker (2005). As Borck 





I focus on the municipalities of NRW, the state with the highest population in Germany (about 22 % of 
Germany’s inhabitants live there).  
The data is a panel of the 396 German municipalities of the federal state of NRW. The panel spans a 
period from 2009 to 2015 in the core estimations. Accordingly, the final sample contains 2,772 
observations in NRW. The data was obtained from the Genesis online (2016) statistical database of the 
Federal NRW Statistics Office. The investigation period is limited by data availability. Data before 2009 
cannot be used due to the change from cameralistic to double-entry bookkeeping. This conversion 
enables NRW to make all expenditure subcategories available to the public. Data on the structure of 
expenditures is provided with a delay of two years. I have normalized all monetary values using the 
consumer price index based on the year 2010. A detailed description of the expenditure subcategories 
thus defined can be found in the Appendix (see Table A1). Table A1 displays the average structure of 
the eight expenditure subcategories in the municipalities of NRW. The categories follow the 
classification found in the Genesis database of the Federal NRW Statistics Office. This classification 
indicates that administrative expenditure is by far the largest category, followed by social system 
expenditures and transport/ infrastructure/ construction (TIC). The reason why the administration 
category is so large is that it also includes expenditures on transfers such as trade tax allocation or levies 
to the state. 
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The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1, which gives an overview of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis. These were selected along the lines proposed by the tax and spending interaction 
literature, e.g. Case et al. (1993), Borck et al. (2007) etc., and in terms of what the control variables were 
expected to capture (as described in the following paragraph). The dependent variable is the total 
expenditure per capita variable and different expenditure subcategories per capita for each municipality.  
To determine spending interactions, I distinguish between interaction effects and regional economic 
impacts. First, it is important to control for the composition of the population in municipalities because 
expenditures vary with different age structures (spending may be higher or lower). Accordingly, the age 
structure in the municipalities of NRW is included. I collect the GDP at county level (in domestic prices) 
to control for economic performance with an impact on municipal expenditures. In addition, a change 
in the debt level of municipalities could also influence municipal mimicking behavior, so it is important 
to control for the gross debt level per capita, including debts of the fiscal core and municipal companies 
and institutes. As a more densely populated municipality may also provide higher levels of public goods, 
I also include population density as a factor to control for. Given that population and population density 
are highly correlated, I do not include the population variable in the estimations. To control for temporal 
economic shocks in community development, I include unemployment per capita as a variable.1 
Institutional setting 
Germany has a federal system with different levels of government: the central government, the state 
governments, and local governments with counties, districts (which only exist in four German states), 
and municipalities. At the local level, counties (Landkreise) are the most significant entities, in charge 
of such things as public safety, and construction as well as the maintenance of county roads. The more 
than 11,000 municipalities (Gemeinden) function at a subordinate level, largely entitled to handle local 
matters as they see fit (Article 28 (2), Constitutional Law). They decide on the level of the tax multipliers 
that have a direct impact on their business- and property-tax revenues and are responsible for general 
administration, infrastructure, cultural institutions, and sewage, as well as waste disposal, etc., etc.  
 
                                                     
1 The unemployment rate, on the other hand, is not available at the municipal level. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics. 
          Obs. Population-
weighted 
mean 
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Expenditures (p.c.)       
Total expenditure  2772 2619.6 2032.7 538.2 1056.5 7878.6 
TIC  2772 326.4 272.4 131.9 0.3 1065.5 
Administration  2772 1187.5 1147.2 321.4 509.8 6486.1 
Business development  2772 38.5 31.5 56.1 0 1443.5 
Public facilities  2772 104.6 70.9 44.2 3.8 427.3 
Culture/ Sports  2772 107.9 62.6 43.7 0 356.5 
Health system  2772 19.4 12.9 9.1 0 267.8 
Social system  2772 670.9 285.7 276.5 8 2008.1 
Education  2772 164.3 149.4 68.1 13.6 569.4 
Transfers (p.c.)       
Formula-based transfers  2772 311.2 194.2 170.5 -38.4 1116.9 
Transfers for present 
purposes 
2772 102.5 105.2 47.8 0.2 665.7 
Investment transfers 2772 126.5 83.6 58.4 0 336.1 
Tax multipliers       
Property tax multiplier, % 2772 479.2 436.2 74.7 240 876 
Business tax multiplier, % 2772 448 428.4 28.7 285 550 
Other indicators       
Gross debt level p.c. 
(thousand Euros) 
2772 3            1.9     1.5 0 9.4 
% Age 0-65 2772 79.5 0.8 0.02 0.7 0.9 
% Age 65+ 2772 0.2 0.2 0.02 0.12 0.32 
Population 2772  44694.3     87517 4116 1060582 
Population density 2772 1246.2 504.9 533.3 43.2 3221.2 
Gross domestic product 
(GDP) 
2772 14319.9 10015 4639.4 2152.1 58047.3 
Unemployed p.c. 2772 4.3 3.2 1.2 0.66 7.25 
Notes: Statistics for pooled observations 2009-2015 by state. Monetary values in euros, prices as in 2010. 
 
In the estimations I include the subcategories that mainly consist of non-earmarked expenditures. 
Municipalities are partly committed to passing on funds from the upper levels or implementing laws 
connected to expenditures. Possible interdependencies in these subcategories may not stem from 
neighboring interaction effects. This statement applies to the social system subcategory, where 
municipalities have smaller scope for decision-making. Though even in this category municipalities do 
have a degree of discretionary latitude, I exclude it from the estimations. Other subcategories also partly 
including earmarked expenditures are TIC, culture/ sport, and health. As earmarked expenditures 
represent a smaller share of these subcategories, I include them in the main results table. In the 
robustness section, I also present an estimation omitting these subcategories. Apart from that, the 
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robustness section refers to total expenditures only, as is the case with Costa et al. (2015) and others. 
Furthermore, cities with county status (kreisfreie Städte) combine county and municipal functions. I do 
not exclude them from the core estimations because this study focuses mainly on the investigation of 
interaction effects and the impact of agglomeration on spending, both of which also affect cities with 
county status. In this I follow the strategy of Borck et al. (2015) and others. However, in the section on 
robustness, I return to this point and present an estimation excluding cities with county status.2 
 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
Model specification 
One main aim of this paper is to estimate spatial interdependencies between the municipalities of NRW.3 
As a starting point, an unconstrained Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) (equation 1) is set up, as it is a general 
specification and a test for various other spatial panel models such as Spatial Error Model (SEM), Spatial 
Autoregressive Model (SAR), and Spatial Autocorrelation Model (SAC) (Elhorst 2010a; Belotti et al. 
2016). 
 





                             (1) 
 
with index i referring to the municipality and index t referring to the year. yit indicates per-capita 
municipal expenditure. ∑ wijyjt denotes the term that describes the impact on municipalities by their 
neighbors. W is a non-negative N x N weighting matrix, where wij is the i,jth element. ρ is the parameter 
that measures the response to neighboring municipalities. Xit is a 1 x K vector of other control variables 
in municipality i at time t that are important determinants of expenditure, and β is the K x 1 vector of the 
                                                     
2 Another possible concern that I take up in the section on robustness are municipalities subject to consolidation 
assistance. In 2011, the NRW state government initiated a program supporting indebted municipalities with extra 
consolidation assistance. Municipalities receiving such support may be forced to spend less and thus distort the 
core estimations. 
3 Following Leprince et al. (2005) and Fréret and Maguain (2017), vertical effects (where the spending of a local 
government depends on expenditure at other levels) are not found to be relevant and are therefore not considered. 
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estimated parameter. ∑ wijXjt represents the characteristics of the neighboring municipalities, while θ is 
the corresponding K x 1 vector of the parameters estimated. μi and δt represent municipal and time-fixed 
effects. The fixed effects are space-specific, time-invariant variables that are difficult to measure but 
most likely have an impact on the dependent variable, such as location or attitudes. Excluding them 
would incur the risk of inconsistent results. εit is a normally, identically, and independently distributed 
error term.4 Robust inferences are provided through the clustering of standard errors. I apply a double-
clustering strategy that takes the Jacobian matrix of all first-order partial derivatives of the log-likelihood 
function into account because the model specification does not control for spatial autocorrelation in the 
errors (Cameron et al. 2011; Atella et al. 2014). 
As Elhorst (2011) points out, the best model irrespective of the spatial weights matrix applied is the one 
that includes spatial lags of the dependent and independent variables as well as exogenous and 
endogenous interaction effects, while excluding the autocorrelated error term. Such a model is the 
Spatial Durbin Model (equation 1). LeSage and Pace (2009) demonstrate that the cost of ignoring the 
spatial dependence of the dependent and/or independent variables is relatively high compared to the 
modest loss of efficiency incurred when spatial dependence in the error term is ignored. 
Following Elhorst (2014), LeSage (2014), and Belotti et al. (2016), the SDM nests the SEM and the 
SAR. Accordingly, I test whether the SDM or SEM/ SAR are the preferred models in this case. I start 
from a general SDM. If I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the spatial lag of X is insignificant, H0: 
θ=0, then the SAR or a model without spatial dependence is preferable (in the case where ρ=0).  In 
testing whether the SEM is the model of choice, the Common Factor hypothesis is θ=-ρβ. Both can be 
tested using Wald-type tests (Angulo and Mur 2011). Likelihood Ratio (LR) tests are also performed.  
SDM and SAC are non-nested models, so if both previous tests point to a SDM, Akaike's (AIC) and 
Schwarz's Bayesian (BIC) information criteria are drawn upon to test whether the appropriate model is 
a SAC instead. The best model will be the one showing a lower AIC (and BIC). Another possibility 
                                                     
4 Normally distributed error terms in Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimations are a strong assumption (Elhorst 
2014). It has to be emphasized that in relatively large samples the Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimator is 




would be to use a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. Following Belotti et al. (2016), Wald and Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) tests are asymptotically near-equivalent and basically come to the same conclusion. 
As can be seen from Table A2 in the Appendix, both Wald-tests and LR tests favor the SDM. The 
information criteria also point to an SDM rather than an SAC model. In addition, the Hausman test 
indicates that it is better to use a fixed-effects model than a random-effects model. 
To obtain consistent results for equation (1), a bias correction procedure in accordance with Lee and Yu 
(2010) is also applied.5  
Endogeneity 
Two further issues need to be addressed. The first is the endogeneity of ∑ wijyjt, which denotes the term 
describing the impact on municipalities by their neighbors. Endogeneity in this context stems from the 
fact that the expenditures (y) appear on the left- and on the right-hand side of equation (1), so that own 
spending and neighbor spending are determined simultaneously. This violates the assumption of 
standard regression models that E[∑ wijyjt, єit]=0, i.e. is uncorrelated. Ordinary least squares would 
therefore be inconsistent. The second issue is the spatial dependence between observations, which could 
also have an impact on the fixed effects (Elhorst 2010b). 
Both issues are accounted for in the fixed-effects Spatial Durbin Model using a (Quasi) Maximum 
Likelihood (QML) estimator.6 The QML estimator accounts for spatial endogeneity via the Jacobian 
term of the transformation from ε to y (Anselin 1988).7 As pointed out by Fréret and Maguain (2017), 
                                                     
5 This bias correction can be applied in municipally fixed and time-fixed effect models and is referred to as the 
transformation approach. The time-fixed effects involve the incidental-parameter problem in addition to the 
individual effects (see Lee and Yu (2010) for a detailed description). The estimation procedure is performed using 
the Stata module XSMLE for spatial-panel data models via (Quasi) Maximum Likelihood as provided by Belotti 
et al. (2013). The XSMLE command is used with the "leeyu" option to perform inferences with the log-likelihood 
based on the transformation approach. 
In addition, I manually adopt the double de-meaning procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) and also estimate 
the model using XSMLE. This enables me to eliminate time-fixed and municipally fixed effects, too.  
Both procedures produce very similar results and can be obtained from the author upon request. 
6 LeSage and Pace (2009) state that even if a relevant variable (even though unobserved or unknown) is omitted, 
the SDM coefficient estimates are still unbiased. 
7 Note that, due to the fact that the interaction parameter ρ enters the equation non-linearly, the optimization method 
must be non-linear, too. 
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only QML estimations, as employed in this paper, are efficient in dealing internally with spatial 
endogeneity. 
Another possible approach that I apply in the robustness checks is the use of IV/ GMM, as suggested by 
Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999) and Arraiz et al. (2010). I instrument for Wy using the exogenous x 
variables and their spatially lagged counterparts. Both approaches yield consistent estimates and causal 
interpretations, but only the QML estimation is efficient when the model is correctly specified. This 
means that we require the exogeneity of the spatial weighting matrix. Compared to the IV estimator, the 
efficiency of ML is weakly dominant and in terms of unbiasedness its overall performance is good 
(Franzese and Hays 2007). Criticisms of ML estimations center around the fact that the Jacobian term 
becomes unstable if the number of spatial units is greater than 1000 (Anselin 2005). As I am dealing 
with 396 municipalities, this potential drawback is irrelevant in this case.    
Spatial weighting matrices 
To determine the correct weights matrix W, I consider various weighting matrices estimating the 
baseline SDM in equation (1). The literature proposes standard matrices based on exogenous 
geographical proximity (LeSage 2014). In line with this, I consider binary contiguity matrices, where 
Wij is dichotomous, being one if i shares a border with j and zero otherwise. I also consider row-
normalized matrices with municipalities assigned as neighbors within a certain radius around the center 
(15km, 20km, 25km and 30km). As a third type of weighting matrix I look at inverse distance matrices 
under different cut-off radii with the three normalization techniques row, spectral, and minmax – here 
W is a continuous function. In addition, I construct a weighting matrix based on district governments 
(Regierungsbezirke), which exist only in NRW and three other German federal states, i.e. all 
municipalities belonging to the same governmental district are assigned as neighbors.8  
To choose the weighting matrix that suits the data best, I compare the log-likelihood values of the models 
as suggested by Elhorst (2010a). The model with the highest value is the model of choice.  
                                                     
8 There are five district governments in NRW, each having a district president and a regional council determined 
indirectly via municipal elections. Their tasks can play an important role for municipalities because they enforce 
municipal regulations, control regional/ urban planning and development, and are entitled to issue directives. Their 
influence may intensify fiscal expenditure interactions among municipalities. 
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Table A3 in the Appendix presents the spatial weighting matrices and their log-likelihood values. The 
row-normalized, inverse-distance matrix with a cut-off radius at 25 km performs best. The relative 
distance to other neighbors is crucial, and the closer the neighbors are, the higher they are weighted. In 
my main specifications I therefore employ this matrix as a standard matrix. In addition, the estimated 
total expenditure interaction coefficient is presented for all weighting matrices tested.  
Non-standard matrices 
Non-standard weighting matrices account for the special spatial characteristics of the municipal 
institutional setting and enable municipalities to weight the decisions of similar municipalities higher. 
Generally, the spatial weights matrices are assumed to be exogenous. With weights matrices based on 
socioeconomic distances, the assumption of exogeneity may be invalid. Weights based on variables such 
as population density or unemployment are endogenous because the dependent expenditure variable has 
an impact on them (Anselin and Bera 1998). As a consequence, I do not consider those non-standard 
weights matrices in selecting the standard matrix for my main specification but rather regard them as a 
confirmation and as a test for the robustness of the main results. 
First, I construct a weighting matrix based on socio-economic variables (Št’astná 2009). It is based on 
geographical neighborhood or, more precisely, on the selected standard matrix as set out above but with 
different weightings due to mean municipal characteristics V, such as population, population density, 
population aged 65 plus, and unemployment per capita.9 
Other non-standard spatial weights matrices that I construct are based on the paper of Janeba and 
Osterloh (2013) and were also applied by Borck et al. (2015). Core centers are assumed to mainly 
compete with other core centers and direct neighboring municipalities. By contrast, the periphery, and 
especially small municipalities, compete with municipalities at short distances only. To take such 
weighting matrices into account, I allocate those municipalities as neighbors that both have a mean 
population (period 2009-2015) above a defined ceiling and are located within the 25-km radius. The 
remaining municipalities consider the municipalities within a 25-km radius as their neighbors. 
                                                     
9 The xk variables are normalized from 0 to 1. The weight is then given by 𝑤𝑖𝑗 =  
1
𝑉





A general note of caution is in order here. To identify causal effects, a number of restrictions need to be 
made to the weighting matrices. Some of the literature contends that for IV estimations the spatial lags 
of x are neighbor averages that are often mutually correlated and therefore cannot be suitable 
instruments. Hence the exogeneity assumption is most likely violated when IV/ GMM methods are 
applied. I follow Elhorst and Feret (2009), Borck et al. (2015), Fréret and Maguain (2017), etc. by 
rejecting IV/ GMM as my preferred estimation method. Instead, I adhere to the QML method, where 
the Jacobian term purges the endogeneity problem of the interaction effect, given that the weights matrix 
W is known and depicts real-world linkages. The latter aspect is an object of criticism, too, because it is 
a strong assumption that is very difficult to bear out (Gibbons and Overman 2012). I construct more 
than twenty different weighting matrices W to address these concerns. In addition, I include spatial as 
well as time-fixed effects and add independent control variables. The interaction coefficient is 
significant in all of the estimations, which is an initial proof of the validity of the results (see Table A3). 
When I apply inverse distance matrices under different cut-off radii with the three normalization 
techniques row, spectral, and minmax, the fiscal interaction coefficient increases with the number of 
municipalities included (as distance increases). This is plausible because the definition of neighborhood 




In this section I present the main results for fiscal expenditure interactions in total expenditures and in 
the expenditure subcategories. Later in the section I also present empirical findings on the impact of 
agglomeration economies on expenditure interactions. I apply the SDM from equation (1) and use a 
QML estimator. 
The main results are presented in Table 2. The evidence indicates that expenditure interactions do exist. 
I find significant fiscal expenditure interactions (ρ) between the municipalities of NRW in total 
expenditures p.c. (column 1) and in four expenditure subcategories. For the total expenditures p.c., the 
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estimated spatial effect is positive and significant at the 1 % level, i.e. spatial effects play a role in 
explaining neighboring government expenditures, which suggests that an OLS model would be biased 
and inconsistent. The coefficient of 0.124 means that a 1-euro increase in expenditures by the 
neighboring municipalities will increase the municipality’s own spending by 12.4 eurocents. This 
confirms the complementary characteristics of total municipal spending levels. The comparison of this 
coefficient across models applying different definitions of contiguity (Table A3) indicates that the 
coefficient has a similar size and is both positive and significant in all specifications.10 
Among the expenditure subcategories, the fiscal interaction coefficient is insignificant for the 
administration category as well as for public facility and education. Administration mainly comprises 
expenditures on regulatory affairs, general transfers, and levies. These expenditures are to some extent 
fixed and thus do not strongly depend on neighbor spending, which may explain the insignificant 
coefficient. The same goes for the education subcategory, which consists of material and general 
expenditures that display only minor deviations. Effectively, construction expenses in the education 
subcategory are subject to a superordinate strategy determined by the state. By contrast, public facility 
has both expenditures that are fixed (like spending on emergency services) and those that vary (like 
spending on environmental measures). It appears, however, that municipalities do not to interact with 
their neighbors with regard to these expenditures. 
I find a positive and significant spatial effect for business development, which partly confirms the 
empirical investigations on expenditure interaction undertaken by Borck et al. (2007) at the German 
county level. Although the coefficient on business development in the present paper is smaller, it still 
indicates fiscal competition between municipalities. In order to stay competitive, municipalities increase 
their expenditures on business development to attract companies or boost economic activity. On the 
other hand, I find negative but significant coefficients in the subcategories TIC, Culture/ Sport, and 
Health. They range between 8 and 11 eurocents. If the neighboring municipalities increase their 
                                                     
10 I also test whether the SDM eliminates spatial autocorrelation of the residuals. To this end, I construct the 
Moran’s I statistic of the residuals of the total expenditures. This can only be done for each cross-section in the 
seven years. The Moran’s I shows that the autocorrelation is close to zero in all seven cross-section estimates and 
significantly different from zero in only two of them, which indicates that the SDM almost completely eliminates 
spatial autocorrelation of the residuals. The result is confirmed in the other expenditure subcategories. 
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expenditures by 1 euro, the municipality will decrease spending in these subcategories. As discussed 
similarly by Borck et al. (2007), this decline can be explained by public expenditure spillovers. It is 
associated with free-riding behavior on the part of municipalities. Municipalities take advantage of the 
spill-in and reduce expenditure e.g. for passenger transport (TIC), sport/ culture funding (Culture/ Sport) 
or health care (Health). The residents of the given municipality benefit from amenities provided by 
neighboring municipalities. The expenditures in these subcategories are strategic substitutes.  
Table 2. Main results - Fiscal expenditure interactions between the municipalities of NRW  
 
    QML    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 






















































































































































































Log-Likelihood -16259.39 -15799.93 -13417.04 -10655.1 -12428.32 -10655.54 -7970.46 -11861.64 
N 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 
Note: ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. All models are estimated using the bias correction procedure proposed 
by Lee and Yu (2010) with maximum likelihood. Robust standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, 
*** p<0.01. 
 
Comprehensive interpretation of the estimates also requires the consideration of direct, indirect, and 
total effects (marginal effects) (LeSage and Pace 2009). I concentrate on the total expenditure category 
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because it is the sum of all expenses per capita in a municipality. The interpretation of all marginal 
effects is not a major focus in this paper.  
The change in an explanatory variable in municipality i has not only a direct effect on that municipality 
but also an indirect effect on all other municipalities. Thus the direct effect describes how the variable 
of interest in municipality i changes in the case of a change in the kth regressor in that municipality. The 
indirect effect describes how a change in the independent variable in municipality i changes the 
dependent variable in municipality j. Every diagonal element in the NxN matrix of total effects represents 
the direct effects and every off-diagonal element represents the indirect effects (Elhorst 2010a). The sum 
of the direct and the indirect effects is the total effect. 
The direct, indirect, and total effects from the total main specification of Table 2, are shown in Table 3. 
Demand-side variables seem to be more important for direct effects. In particular, the higher the 
population density and the share of people aged 65 plus, the lower are the expenditures per capita. 
Economic factors are not significant at conventional levels. Expenditures mainly depend on population 
structure and its concentration in space and not on the economic development of that municipality. For 
the indirect effects, on the other hand, it suffices that the level of debt p.c. be positive and significant, 
i.e. an increase in debt levels of nearby municipalities increases the expenditures in the municipality of 
interest by way of a feedback process. As for the total effects, Table 3 shows that the variables 
unemployed p.c. and share of people aged 65 plus are significant. This means that a typical region will 
react with an increase in expenditures when unemployment p.c. increases in all other municipalities. On 
the other hand, this typical region would decrease its expenditures if the share of people aged 65 plus 
increased everywhere else. 
Table 3. Average direct, indirect, and total effects from fixed-effects SDM estimates 
 Total expenditures 
  Direct effects Indirect effects Total effects 
GDP -0.012 -0.016 -0.028 
Population density -3.92** 3.8 -0.011 
Unemployed p.c. 46.11 124.52 170.63** 
Share aged 65+ -45.88** -98.53 -144.41* 
Level of debt p.c. -39.03 97.55* 58.52 





For the total expenditures I also analyze whether yardstick competition can be made responsible for 
fiscal interactions. This has formerly been done by Allers and Elhorst (2005), Elhorst and Fréret (2009), 
Delgado et al. (2014) and others in their analyses of tax rates. If yardstick competition is the driving 
force behind mimicking behavior, the interaction effect should be smaller and significantly different in 
municipalities governed by a large majority than in those governed by a small majority or by a party 
with no absolute majority. If the electoral margin is high, the majority party’s reelection will be relatively 
certain. I envisage interaction between neighboring expenditures and a dummy variable that equals one 
if majorities in the councils are larger 55 %, 60 %, 65 % or 70 % for the governing coalition and zero 
otherwise.  
As Allers and Elhorst (2005) have pointed out, mimicking behavior may also be different when right-
wing parties (CDU, FDP, REP) rule the roost (with a majority larger than 50%) instead of left-wing 
parties (SPD, Alliance 90/The Greens, The Left, The Pirates). The dummy variable interacting with 
neighbor expenditures equals one if the municipality is controlled by a right-wing government and zero 
otherwise. The results are presented in Appendix Table A4 and show that in neither case is the 
interaction effect significantly different for varying majorities. Also, municipalities with right-wing 
party majorities are not concerned with different fiscal expenditure interaction. Yardstick competition 
or dependence on party affiliation in the council cannot be made responsible for fiscal expenditure 
interactions in NRW. 
Another issue I explore is whether the spending behavior of municipalities controlled by an absolute 
majority of right-wing parties differs from those with other majority structures (left-wing majorities or 
no absolute majorities).11 I introduce a dummy that is one if the local government has a right-wing 
majority and zero otherwise. This produces interesting results for spending behavior in several 
subcategories. Right-wing parties may tend to be more rigorous about saving than left-wing parties. 
                                                     
11 The argument is that left-wing majorities are in favor of redistribution and stand for a more active role by the 
state, leading to an increase in public spending (Tellier 2006). 
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The results are presented in Table A5 in the Appendix. The coefficient for total expenditure is about 72 
and significant. In contradiction to the theory discussed above, this means that in total municipalities 
with a right-wing majority spend about 72 euros more per capita than municipalities with left-wing or 
no majorities. Accordingly, there is no confirmation for their reputation for being more rigorous savers. 
Most of the sum (approx. 52 euros) is spent on the administration subcategory. This can partly be 
explained by higher spending on administration management and service as well as on regulatory 
matters. Right-wing majorities spend about 6 euros per capita more on the public facility subcategory, 
most of it on fire protection, emergency services, and disaster control. 
Agglomeration effects 
This section assesses the role agglomerations play in fiscal expenditure interactions. The agglomeration 
measure applied is average population density.12 I test whether expenditure interactions are stronger or 
weaker in more agglomerated municipalities, i.e., whether neighbor spending plays a larger or a smaller 
role in more densely populated municipalities. 
Following Charlot and Paty (2010) and Fréret and Maguain (2017) on the subject of taxes, –I interact 
neighbor expenditures with an agglomeration index based on population density. I define two 
agglomeration regimes (strong and weak agglomeration) with two interaction coefficients and once 
again concentrate on total expenditures. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝜌𝑢 ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑦𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑙𝑜𝑖 +
𝑁
𝑗=1







where Aggloi is the agglomeration measure, a binary variable equal to one if municipality i is 
characterized by high agglomeration and zero otherwise. Five alternative definitions of agglomeration 
                                                     
12 In the literature, different agglomeration indices are applied. I follow Ciccone and Hall (1996), Charlot and Paty 
(2010), Briant et al. (2010), etc. and use population density to determine the size of urbanization economies. 
Localization economies on the other hand measure externalities that indicate attributes of industry (Combes and 
Gobillon 2015). Other agglomeration indices capturing local urbanization economies include the total sum of 
salaried jobs in municipality i divided by the area of that municipality (Fréret and Maguain 2017). Applying the 
latter agglomeration indicator to our model does not significantly change our findings.  The results can be obtained 
from the author upon request.  
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are used, with high agglomeration being defined as whether population density is above the 50 %, the 
60%, the 70 %, the 80 % or the 90 % quantile. ρu measures the additional effect on fiscal interactions if 
the agglomeration level is high.13 
If agglomeration economies have an effect on fiscal expenditure interactions, then there should be a 
significant coefficient for ρu whatever the sign is. As in equation (1), Xit is a 1 x K vector of control 
variables in municipality i at time t that are important expenditure determinants, and β is the vector of 
the estimated parameter. μi and δt again represent municipal and time-fixed effects. I apply the same 
row-normalized, inverse-distance weights matrix with a cut-off radius at 25 km as in the main results.14 
Table 4. Main results - Fiscal expenditure interactions in the light of agglomeration between the 
municipalities of NRW 
 
  QML   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Total Total Total Total Total 
Cut-off point of the 
agglomeration index 





















Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood -17689.98 -17690.87 -17693.51 -17696.96 -17696.03 
N 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 
Note: The dependent variable is the total expenditure per capita, ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. All models 
are estimated using the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) with maximum likelihood. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
                                                     
13 The model has been calculated using the SPM command written by Atella et al. (2014) in Stata and applying a 
two-way clustered variance–covariance matrix. 
14 The way I introduce the two-regime matrix has many parallels in the literature, e.g. in the studies by Allers and 
Elhorst (2005), Elhorst and Fréret (2009), Charlot and Paty (2010), Fréret and Maguain (2017), etc. LeSage and 
Pace (2011), however, criticize this way of extending spatial regression models although they focus on an SAR-
type model. One of their remarks is that the specification relies on the assumption that parts of the combination of 
different weight matrices vanish, which is only possible if W is zero. They also note that the model acts in a way 
that contradicts the hypothesis it sets out because it does not take into account the feedback effects of all interacting 
regions. 
A possible solution that has been advanced in the recent literature but has not yet been completely implemented 
involves the calculation of a QML model with heterogeneous coefficients (Aquaro et al. 2015). 
Nevertheless, in awareness of these distortions and fully cognizant of the fact that comprehensive solutions are not 
available, the specifications applied provide an indication of the magnitude of interactions under agglomeration 
regimes of the kind referred to in the studies quoted.  
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As from Table 4 shows, the coefficient of the interaction between neighboring expenditures and 
population density is significant in all columns. Fiscal expenditure interactions (ρ) below the respective 
quantile are significant in all columns and range from 31 to 36 eurocents for every 1-euro increase in 
neighboring municipal spending. By contrast, the coefficient of municipalities with high agglomeration 
is significantly smaller, ranging between -9.7 and +13.9 eurocents. Especially interesting is the 
interaction coefficient for municipalities above the 90 % quantile with the negative sign (-9.7). It 
indicates that those municipalities (10 % most agglomerated) lower total expenditures in response to an 
increase by their neighbors. The results show that in more agglomerated municipalities expenditure 
interactions are weaker and may even be negative.15 The results confirm the findings by Fréret and 
Maguain (2017) proving that neighbors’ taxes play less of a role in highly agglomerated regions. It 




In this section I perform a number of robustness checks, assessing other specifications to establish 
whether the main results are stable and the main SDM estimation results can be confirmed. To save 
space, the checks will be applied to total expenditure p.c. only because it covers all expenditure 
subcategories. 
Including, excluding, and lagging other potential control variables 
I begin by including three variables that may influence per capita expenditures - and vice versa. These 
are total transfers (1), earmarked transfers plus total revenues p.c. (2), and property and business tax 
rates (3). I use lags of these variables to reduce endogeneity issues. As can be seen from the relevant 
rows in Table 5, the point estimates of the interaction effect are still significant and positive. The 
coefficient in row (1) changes slightly compared to the main results. In row (2) the coefficient is larger 
                                                     
15 Since yardstick competition is not responsible for fiscal expenditure interactions in NRW, there is no connection 
between agglomeration economies and yardstick competition, although both Costa et al. (2011) and Costa and 
Carvalho (2013) suggest the contrary. 
22 
 
but the point estimates are not significantly different. The same applies to the coefficient in row (3), 
where I include both the property and the business tax rate. In row (4) I exclude the gross debt level p.c. 
from the estimation because it is largely determined simultaneously with total expenditures and could 
thus be endogenous. Here again, the point estimates are significant, positive, and very similar to the 
main results (not significantly different). This can be considered a substantial confirmation of robustness 
in the main results. From the first four rows I conclude that the estimates for ρ are robust to the inclusion 
or exclusion of additional control variables. In row (5) of Table 5, I apply lagged independent variables 
because it is possible that their impact on expenditures may be deferred. This estimation shows no 
significant difference in the point estimate for the spatial interaction effect either.  
Changes in model features and estimation period 
In row (6) I exclude both municipal and year-fixed effects. The unobserved effects that I control for by 
the inclusion of fixed effects are probably correlated with the dependent and independent variables, so 
not controlling for them produces biased estimates. The point estimate of spatial interaction increases 
significantly. Hence, an upward bias is apparent. Furthermore, in row (7), I estimate equation (1) without 
Lee and Yu’s bias correction (2010). In row (8), I employ the difference in per capita expenditures as 
the dependent variable. As can be seen in both rows, the point estimates are larger but still not 
significantly different from the main result. In row (9), I add a linear trend instead of year-fixed effects. 
The estimate is 0.072 points larger but still not significantly different from the interaction effect in the 
main results.  
Varying the sample 
Shortening the estimation period (data before 2009 is not applicable due to the change from cameralistic 
to double-entry bookkeeping) does not change the interaction effect significantly (row 10). Although 
mean expenditures are higher per capita in cities with county status, I still include those municipalities 
in my main results. I now return to this issue and in row (11) present the interaction effect of a sample 
that excludes cities with county status. Another concern that I take up is the question of municipalities 
subject to the 2011 consolidation assistance. Municipalities receiving such assistance may be forced to 
spend less and thus distort my main estimations. The interaction effect of a sample without 
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municipalities receiving consolidation assistance is shown in row (12). In row (13) I subtract all partly 
earmarked subcategories, i.e.  social system, TIC, culture/ sport, and health. In all three rows, the 
interaction coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero. 
Additionally, I perform an estimation with a placebo weighting matrix. Following Borck et al. (2015), I 
apply a weighting matrix that determines random neighbors. As shown in row (14), the interaction 
coefficient becomes insignificant and negative, thus no longer displaying mimicking behavior. 
The robustness checks of Table 5 largely confirm the interaction effect in the main results: it is positive, 
significant, and not substantially different. 
Table 5. Robustness results - Fiscal expenditure interactions between the municipalities of NRW  
Specification QML 
  ρ Standard Error N 
1) Including total transfers 0.102** 0.0589 1980 
2) Including earmarked transfers and total 
revenues p.c. 
0.192*** 0.0441 1980 
3) Including property and business tax 
multiplier 
0.114** 0.057 1980 
4) Excluding gross debt level p.c. 0.118*** 0.0488 2376 
5) Using lagged independent variables 0.14*** 0.0529 1980 
6) No fixed effects 0.306*** 0.0402 2772 
7) No Lee and Yu (2010) bias correction 0.153*** 0.0437 2772 
8) Difference in y 0.163*** 0.046 1980 
9) Trend instead of year FE 0.196*** 0.0516 2376 
10) Changed period (2010-2015) 0.143*** 0.0534 1980 
11) Excluding cities with county status 0.142*** 0.048 2238 
12) Excluding municipalities subject to 
consolidation aids 
0.102** 0.049 2010 
13) Subtracting partly earmarked 
subcategories 
0.099* 0.0509 2376 
14) Placebo weighting matrix (random 
neighbors) 
-0.009 0.0493 2376 
Note: The dependent variable is the total expenditure per capita, ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. All models 
are estimated using the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) with maximum likelihood. 
Independent variables in the specifications are: population-density, gross domestic product on county levels, share 
of people aged 65+, unemployed per capita and the gross debt level p.c. The averaged neighboring equivalents are 
included as well as independent variables. Municipal and year fixed effects are included. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Alternative spatial regression model specifications 
In this section I shift my attention away from the sole application of the Spatial Durbin Model and home 
in on other spatial regression models. Although the SDM nests the SEM and SAR models and the SDM 
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is model of choice, I use columns (1 and 2) of Table A6 to present the results of the two models most 
commonly applied in the literature. The point estimates are somewhat higher, but not significantly 
different. 
Another potential approach I draw upon here focuses on instrumental variables/ GMM. It has been 
shown by Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999). Drukker et al. (2013) show that IV/ GMM estimators can 
be very useful when one or more endogenous explanatory variables are instrumented. Consequently, I 
instrument for Wy by applying x and Wx, the independent and the spatially lagged independent variables 
that are natural instruments in this context and include the spatially auto-correlated error term (Elhorst 
2010a). This also takes account of the spatial dependence in the error terms. 
Column (3) of Table A6 in the Appendix depicts a positive and significant fiscal expenditure interaction 
point estimate that is very similar in range to QML estimations. Again, the robustness of the main 
findings is confirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper is an empirical analysis of municipal expenditures in the light of fiscal interactions. I 
investigate spatial interdependencies between the German municipalities of North Rhine-Westphalia 
(NRW) in the years 2009-2015, focusing not only on total expenditures but also on a complete set of 
non-earmarked expenditure subcategories.  
For the total expenditures I find a positive and significant spatial interaction effect of about 12 eurocents 
when neighbors increase their expenditures by 1 euro. This is confirmed by the robustness checks. 
Reaction functions also vary for different expenditure subcategories. For reasons discussed above, the 
fiscal interaction coefficient in those subcategories is insignificant for administration, public facility, 
and education. I also find a positive and significant spatial effect for business development, which 
indicates that fiscal competition is present and confirms the empirical investigations by Borck et al. 
(2007) on expenditure interaction at German county level. On the other hand, I find negative and 
significant coefficients in the subcategories TIC, Culture/ Sport, and Health, which can be explained as 
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expenditure spillovers. Residents benefit from amenities provided by neighboring municipalities. The 
empirical evidence thus indicates that municipalities do not ignore their neighbors when making 
expenditure decisions. 
I also analyze whether yardstick competition, where the reaction function declines as the municipal 
electoral margin increases, can be a source of such interactions. I find no evidence for this.  
In addition, I analyze the effects of agglomeration on the intensity of public expenditure interactions 
using a two-regime matrix in an SDM model. A major finding of the paper is the evidence suggesting 
that expenditure interaction is fiercer if a municipality is less agglomerated. Urbanized and populous 
municipalities benefit from agglomeration economies, a circumstance that enables them to spend less 
than their neighbors. 
The identification of the expenditure mimicking phenomenon is valuable in designing fine-tuned public 
policies for local municipalities and ensuring efficient expenditure planning. Spending and investment 
decisions in the subcategories business development, TIC, culture and sport, and health are affected 
strongly by spatial interactions. The fiscal interaction changes detected in more agglomerated 
municipalities prove that theoretical considerations on agglomeration rents also apply to expenditure 
interactions. More highly agglomerated municipalities are indeed less dependent on their neighbors, 
which is another useful indication for the design of local governmental policies, for instance in allocating 
financial benefits such as transfers that mostly depend on population size. As agglomeration rents exist 
urban regions in particular have a higher chance to attract residents and firms. This issue should not be 

































Table A1. The expenditure subcategories. 
Expenditure 
subcategory  








Spatial planning and development, geo-information, 
construction and property regulation, housing- 
construction funding, electricity, gas, water, district 
heat supply, waste management, sewage disposal, 
municipal-roads, district-roads, state-roads, federal-
roads, road cleaning, parking facilities, public 
transport, other passenger and goods transport, ports 
13-14 % Mainly non-
earmarked 
Administration Administration management and service, statistics 
and elections, regulatory affairs, funeral and cemetery 
services, taxes, general transfers and general levies, 
general financial economy 




General institutions and companies, business 
development, tourism 
1-2 % Mainly non-
earmarked 
Public facilities Fire protection, emergency services, large-scale 
emergencies, disaster control, public green areas, 
nature and rural conservation, agriculture and 
forestry, environmental measures, immission 
protection, landscaping, public waters, water supply 
plants, monument conservation and care 
3-4 % Mainly non-
earmarked 
Culture/ Sport Museums, exhibitions, zoological and botanical 
gardens, theater, public music culture, music schools, 
adult education center, libraries, other adult 
education, cultural education, national education, 
clerical affairs, sport funding, sport facilities 
3-4 % Mainly non-
earmarked 
Health system Health administration, hospitals, health care, 
recreational facility, spas and bath houses   
1 % Mainly non-
earmarked 
Social system Primary care, basic social benefits,  benefits for 
asylum seekers, social facilities, war victim welfare, 
benefits under the Federal Pensions Act, benefits for 
severely disabled persons, funding of welfare 
carriers, benefits for living, inclusion of disabled 
persons, help with care, advances  on maintenance 
payments, assistance services, funding for returnees 
and political prisoners, other social services, funding 
for children, youth work, services for young people 
and families   
12-14 % Mainly 
earmarked 
Education Primary schools, secondary schools, combined 
primary and secondary schools, high schools, 
comprehensive schools, vocational schools, special 
schools, other formal school tasks, science and 
research 
6-7 % Mainly non-
earmarked 







Table A2. Specification tests for spatial panel 2009-2015 
 
NRW 
Wald Test SDM vs. SAR 21.87*** 
LR Test SDM vs. SAR 94.24*** 
Wald Test SDM vs. SEM 19.31*** 
LR Test SDM vs. SEM 89.23*** 
Information criteria SDM vs. SAC SDM: AIC: 32593 BIC: 32662;  SAC: AIC: 
32661 BIC: 32707 
Spatial Hausman Test Fixed vs. Random Effect 129.68*** 
Notes: All models are estimated with population-density, gross domestic product, share of old people (65+), 
unemployed per capita and debt level per capita as independent variables. Year and municipality fixed effects are 
taken into account by a double demeaning procedure. W is a row normalized Inverse Distance Matrix with a cut-
off point after 25 km. Test statistics are significant at: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Source: own calculations. 
 
 
Table A3. Spatial weight model comparison 
Weight specification W ρ Log-likelihood 
Binary contiguity second order (row standardized) 0.069* 
(0.0371) 
-16267.43 
Binary contiguity third order (row standardized) 0.132** 
(0.0578) 
-16265.93 




Binary Neighbors within 20 km 0.068*** 
(0.0001) 
-16469.52 
Binary Neighbors within 25 km 0.121*** 
(0.0001) 
-16647.69 
Binary Neighbors within 30 km 0.29*** 
(0.0001) 
-17624.21 




Inverse Distance 20 km (row standardized) 0.097** 
(0.0392) 
-16261.47 
Inverse Distance 25 km (row standardized) 0.124*** 
(0.0475) 
-16259.39 




Inverse Distance 15 km (spectral standardized) 0.093** 
(0.0466) 
-16267.03 
Inverse Distance 20 km (spectral standardized) 0.121** 
(0.0566) 
-16264.34 
Inverse Distance 25 km (spectral standardized) 0.153** 
(0.0641) 
-16262.57 
Inverse Distance 30 km (spectral standardized) 0.183** 
(0.0708) 
-16263.17 
Inverse Distance 15 km (minmax standardized) 0.126** 
(0.0636) 
-16267.03 
Inverse Distance 20 km (minmax standardized) 0.152** 
(0.0713) 
-16264.34 
Inverse Distance 25 km (minmax standardized) 0.185** 
(0.0774) 
-16262.57 





















Notes: The dependent variable is the total expenditure per capita, ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. All models 
are estimated using the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) with maximum likelihood. 
Independent variables in the specifications are: population-density, gross domestic product on county levels, share 
of people aged 65+, unemployed per capita and the gross debt level p.c. The averaged neighboring equivalents are 
included as well as independent variables.  
According to Drukker et al. (2013): Row standardized matrices - Each element in row i is divided by the sum of 
row i’s element. Spectral normalized matrix – each element is divided by the modulus of the largest eigenvalue of 
the matrix. Minmax normalized matrix – each element is divided by the minimum of the largest row sum and 
column sum of the matrix. 





Table A4. Yardstick competition - Fiscal expenditure interactions between the municipalities of 
NRW depending on political majorities 
 
  QML   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Total Total Total Total Total 
 Seat shares >55 
% 
Seat shares >60 
% 
Seat shares >65 
% 
Seat shares >70 
% 






















Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-Likelihood -17691.57 -17683.94 -17693.56 -17686.77 -17691.35 
N 2772 2772 2772 2772 2772 
Note: The dependent variable is the total expenditure per capita, ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. All models 
are estimated using the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) with maximum likelihood. 
Independent variables in the specifications are: population-density, gross domestic product on county levels, share 
of people aged 65+, unemployed per capita and the gross debt level p.c. The averaged neighboring equivalents are 

















Table A5. Results including right-wing dummy - Fiscal expenditure interactions between the 
municipalities of NRW 
 
    QML    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





































Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log-Likelihood -16254.96 -15796.42 -13416.73 -10651.51 -12427.86 -10655.52 -7969.73 -11861.23 
N 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 2376 
Note: The dependent variable is the total expenditure per capita, ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. All models 
are estimated using the bias correction procedure proposed by Lee and Yu (2010) with maximum likelihood. 
Independent variables in the specifications are: population-density, gross domestic product on county levels, share 
of people aged 65+, unemployed per capita and the gross debt level p.c. The averaged neighboring equivalents are 





Table A6. Further spatial regression results - Fiscal expenditure interactions between the 
municipalities of NRW 
Estimation methods QML IV/ GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
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(4.23 






Spatial Lags of X NO  NO YES, as 
instruments 
Municipal fixed effects YES YES YES 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Log-Likelihood -16270.28 -16269.08 -18868.61 
Number of obs. 2376 2376 2772 
Note: The dependent variable is the total expenditure per capita, ρ denotes the spatial interaction effect. Spatial 
lags of the independent variables are Instruments in the IV/ GMM estimations: population-density, gross domestic 
product on county levels, share of people aged 65+, unemployed per capita and the gross debt level p.c. The 
averaged neighboring equivalents are included as well as independent variables. Robust standard errors are in 
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